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I. INTRODUCTION
Karl Llewellyn's classic article on the canons of statutory construc-
tion,1 which we rightly celebrate in this Symposium, is too clever by
half. To the reader untutored in the scholarly literature on statutory
interpretation, the "thrust but parry" pairing of the canons is a delight-
ful demonstration of how legal argument is structured in a way guaran-
teed to maintain discretion in the judiciary and to keep lawyers in
business. No case involving a statute is clear cut because the canons can
lend support to either side. This means that no lawyer is without an
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A., 1974 Swarthmore College; J.D.,
1977, Yale Law School.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.A., 1976, Wesleyan Uni-
versity; J.D., 1979, Columbia Law School.
1. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Ca-
nons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
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argument, and a judge is free to do what he or she thinks "situation
sense," natural justice, or economic efficiency demands.
But this rendering of the tools of statutory interpretation really
misses the point. The canons are not free-floating rules, snatched out of
the air or created on the spot in helter-skelter fashion. They are rules of
thumb ("generalizations of experience," Felix Frankfurter called them2)
for approaching legal texts, and as such, canons have at least two attrib-
utes: they summarize common- sensical ways of thinking about lan-
guage and communication, and they follow from a broader normative
theory about the proper way to read statutes. For example, if one starts
with a theory that an interpreter ought to read a statute as its drafters
would have read it at the time of enactment, then certain rules or
guidelines for interpretation become sensible based on our assumptions
regarding how legal drafters indicate their intent.
From this perspective, the battle of canons identified by Llewellyn
is really an inter-system, not an intra-system, dispute. This is easiest to
see if one focuses on "plain meaning" and "intentionalist" or "purpo-
sive" theories of interpretation. It is immediately apparent that many
of the "thrust but parry" pairs simply represent a canon from one
model posed against one from the other. Thus:
1. A statute cannot go beyond its text. [plain meaning]
But
To effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text. [purpose]
12. If the language is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect. [plain
meaning]
But
Not when a literal interpretation would lead to absurd or mischievous conse-
quences or thwart manifest purpose. [purpose]
18. Words are to be interpreted according to the proper grammatical effect of their
arrangement within the statute. [plain meaning]
But
Rules of grammar will be disregarded where strict adherence would defeat purpose.
[purpose]
19. Exceptions not made cannot be read. [plain meaning]
But
The letter is only the "bark." Whatever is within the reason of the law is within the
law itself. [purpose]3
So Llewellyn's article should lead us not to despair or ridicule, but
rather to a discussion of the more interesting question of the appropri-
ate normative approach, which, in turn, might well dissolve the very
2. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527,
544 (1947).
3. Llewellyn, 3 Vand. L. Rev. at 401-04 (cited in note 1).
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oppositions that have made the piece famous."
In the current legal generation, the Supreme Court and its aca-
demic critics have marshalled different canons deriving from radically
different underlying normative approaches. As many have noted,5 the
justices appear increasingly drawn to "plain meaning" or textualist
readings. In contrast, the scholars have tended to favor purposive or
pragmatic approaches, frequently of nonoriginalist varieties.
In this Article, we wish to provide a case study of "plain meaning"
by examining a recent decision of the Supreme Court, West Virginia
University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey.' Casey held that prevailing civil
rights litigants could not recover expert witness fees as a part of the
"attorney's fees" awardable under Title 42, Section 1988 of the United
States Code.7 We argue that the Court's approach did not do justice to
the statute or Congress and- most importantly-to the persons the
statute attempts to protect. Furthermore, the Court's reliance on "plain
meaning" left it wholly uninterested in the legal context in which the
statute must operate. The result, at least in this case, is a Court-im-
posed incoherence, blind both to the manifest congressional purpose
and to the real-world consequences of the literalistic reading. We sug-
gest a norm of "due process of statutory interpretation" that would ask
an adjudicator to ensure that the meaning imposed upon a statutory
text bears, at a minimum, a plausible connection to some practical pur-
pose that makes sense in our legal system.8
4. Fixing on a single normative approach would not resolve all disputes about the canons:
some of Llewellyn's pairs mark "intra-approach" disputes. See, for example, pair 8 in which both
the "thrust" and the "parry" follow from a purpose approach. Id. at 402.
To Llewellyn, the existence of competing canons flowed inexorably from the law's (false) claim
that traditional legal sources and logic yield "one single correct answer" to any legal problem.
Because, in fact, statutes and precedents can yield up any number of plausible or permissible
readings, a legal system dedicated to a "right answer" must have tools that allow it to believe that
the answer is compelled. Competing canons are the natural result. In every case, a judge can ap-
pear to deduce the right answer through application of the appropriate iron- clad interpretive
rules. In short, the competing canons permit the legal system to maintain the myth of determi-
nacy. Id. at 399.
5. See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621
(1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Mean-
ing, 1990 S. Ct. Rev. 231; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal
Process, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1597 (1991); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law:
Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892 (1982).
6. 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Part, but by no means all, of the effect of the Court's ruling was
overturned by Congress in § 113 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071 (providing that, in employment discrimination cases, a court "may include expert fees as part
of the attorney's fee").
8. We argue that a practical purpose is necessary because Congress enacts legislation to ac-
complish a given end and that judicial restraint should prevent the Court from elevating its affin-
ity for linguistic simplicity and consistency across the statutory landscape over Congressional
1992] 689
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II. THE CASE: WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY HosPITAIS, INC. V. CASEY
A. The Majority Opinion
In West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,9 the Su-
preme Court held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
19760 (the Fees Act) did not authorize an award of expert witness fees
to the prevailing party in a civil rights case. West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. (WVUH) successfully sued Pennsylvania Governor Rob-
ert Casey and others under Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States
Code, challenging new Medicaid reimbursement schedules adopted by
Pennsylvania and applied to services provided by WVUH to Pennsylva-
nia residents. The hospital sought and was awarded attorney's fees. In-
cluded in the fee award was more than $100,000 for reimbursement of
costs attributable to expert services. The district court had found these
services "essential" to the litigation."
In his opinion for the majority,12 Justice Scalia acknowledged that
courts could shift expert witness fees under the terms of federal stat-
utes that permitted witness fees to be taxed as costs. But the control-
ling statutes limited such costs to a $40 per day "attendance fee"' 3-
clearly far below the costs incurred by WVUH in prosecuting its claim.
In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc.,'4 the Court previously
intent.
9. 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Section 1988 provides in relevant part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986
of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq.], or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et. seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
11. 111 S. Ct. at 1140.
12. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined Jus-
tice Scalia's majority opinion. Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Stevens,
who was joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun.
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821(b), 1920 (1966 & Supp. 1991).
At the time Casey was brought, § 1821 provided that "[a] witness shall be paid an attendance
fee of $30 per day for each day's attendance. A witness shall also be paid the attendance fee for the
time necessarily occupied in going to and returning from the place of attendance ... ." Act of Oct.
27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-535, 92 Stat. 2033, cited in Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1140. While Casey was
pending before the Supreme Court the attendance fee was increased to $40 per day by the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 314(a), 104 Stat. 5115, cited in Casey 111 S. Ct.
at 1140 n.2.
14. 482 U.S. 437 (1987). Crawford held that 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and § 1821(b) define the full
extent of a federal court's power to shift litigation costs absent some other explicit statutory au-
thorization. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides that:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshall;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
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had determined that these statutes define the full extent of a district
court's authority to shift costs, absent other express statuory authoriza-
tion. The question in Casey, therefore, was whether Section 1988, which
permits the shifting of "a reasonable attorney's fee," constituted ex-
press authority to shift expert fees.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion examined statutory usage and
concluded that attorney's fees and expert fees are distinct items for
purposes of defining litigation expenses. He rested his judgment on the
fact that some statutes refer only to attorney's fees, while others explic-
itly refer to expert witness fees in addition to attorney's fees.15 Scalia
rejected arguments that the judicial usage of the phrase "attorney's
fees" before 1976, the date of Section 1988's enactment, included expert
witness fees. His analysis, however, focused not on civil rights cases, but
rather consisted of a survey of fee-shifting in litigation ranging from
securities' 6 and antitrust cases1 to contracts and tort claims'" and state
law diversity actions.' 9 Furthermore, in the absence of statutory author-
ity to do otherwise, Justice Scalia refused to distinguish between testi-
monial and nontestimonial expert services and applied the $40 per day
witness fee limit to both.0
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries,
fees, expenses and costs of special interpretation services under Section 1828 of this title.
15. Justice Scalia noted that "[a]t least 34 statutes in 10 different titles of the U.S. Code
explicitly shift attorney's fees and expert witness fees." Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1142.
16. Id. at 1144 (citing Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974)).
17. Id. at 1145 (citing Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.
1961)).
18. Id. at 1144 (citing Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1968);
Coughenour v. Campbell Barge Line, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 501 (W.D. Pa. 1974)).
19. Id. (citing Burgess v. Williamson, 506 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1975); Henning v. Lake Charles
Harbor and Terminal Dist., 387 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1968)).
20. Id. at 1143-46.
As Judge Posner has observed:
Experts are not only hired to testify; sometimes they are hired, also or instead, to educate
counsel in a technical matter germane to the suit. The time so spent by the expert is a substi-
tute for lawyer time, just as paralegal time is, for if prohibited (or deterred by the cost) from
hiring an expert the lawyer would attempt to educate himself about the expert's area of
expertise.
Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 1989).
Justice Scalia did not, and indeed could not, refute the logic of Judge Posner's analysis. In-
stead, he pointed to pre-1976 statutes explicitly authorizing fees for nontestimonial services and
concluded that such statutes established a usage prior to 1976 similar to the one that continued
after 1976. Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1142-43, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1988). That provision directed
reimbursement to court-appointed counsel for expert fees necessary to the defense of indigent
criminal defendants. The same Act's immediately preceding provision, in contrast, directed that
appointed counsel be reimbursed a designated hourly rate plus "expenses reasonably incurred" 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1). Justice Scalia also cited 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A), which shifted fees and
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The Casey majority also rejected the argument that Section 1988
was an attempt to repudiate Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilder-
ness Society" in all respects and to restore the pre-Alyeska regime,
which allowed equitable fee- shifting in some civil rights cases. In Aly-
eska the Court held that, in the absence of any statute explicitly au-
thorizing fee-shifting, the American rule required each side to bear its
own attorney's fees.22 Justice Scalia acknowledged that the chronology
of Section 1988 and the House and Senate reports supported the con-
tention that the statute was a response to Alyeska. He concluded, how-
ever, that the statute could not have been meant to return precisely to
the pre-Alyeska regime because it authorized fees only for suits brought
pursuant to certain enumerated civil rights statutes and did not extend
to litigation brought under the environmental statutes at issue in Aly-
eska. Accordingly, the objective of achieving a return to the pre-Aly-
eska world could not justify a departure "from the normal import of the
text.
2 3
In ruling that expert fees could not be recovered as an aspect of
attorney's fees, Justice Scalia had to distinguish Missouri v. Jenkins,24
in which the Court held that paralegal and law clerk's fees are recover-
able under Section 1988. In Justice Scalia's view, "[i]t was not remotely
other expenses including those for nontestimonial expert witness services. The Justice observed
that "[i]f the reasonable cost of a 'study' or 'analysis'--which is but another way of describing
nontestimonial expert services-is by common usage already included in the 'attorney's fees,' again
a significant and highly detailed part of the statute becomes redundant." Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1143.
Thus, rather than addressing the logical coherence of § 1988 in an attempt to effectuate its
purpose, Justice Scalia was concerned with reconciling statutory usage in a way that imposed code
uniformity. He eliminated redundancy at the expense of statutory purpose. Even more inconsis-
tently Justice Scalia posits no persuasive argument for including nontestimonial expert services
within the reach of 28 U.S.C. § 1821. Yet the plain language of the statute refers to "a witness."
See note 13. A nontestifying expert is, by definition, not a witness.
21. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
22. Id. at 247.
23. Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1146. We think another conclusion may follow from the fact that
§ 1988 is limited. Congress in enacting § 1988 was attempting to restore the pre-Alyeska regime
with respect to civil rights enforcement. That regime assumed that prevailing plaintiffs could re-
cover expert witness fees. Because the Alyeska decision did not apply to civil rights statutes that
included fees provisions, these statutes were not included in the Fees Act. If Congress had explic-
itly authorized expert witness fees recovery in § 1988 it would not simply have been restoring the
pre-Alyeska regime; rather it would seem to be treating civil rights plaintiffs differently with re-
spect to expert witness fees recovery based upon the nature of the discrimination they suffered.
That is, plaintiffs suing under the statutes enumerated in § 1988 would be able to recover expert
witness fees, but plaintiffs bringing other civil rights claims-housing discrimination or voting
rights claims, for example-would not. We know of no evidence supporting such a distinction.
Indeed, the Senate Report accompanying the Fees Act states: "The purpose of this Amendment is
to remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws created by the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in [Alyeska] and to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws." Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Awards Act, S. Rep. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
24. 491 U.S. 274 (1989).
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plain in Jenkins that the phrase 'attorney's fee' did not include charges
for law-clerk and paralegal services. Such services, like the services of
'secretaries, messengers, librarians, janitors, and others whose labor
contributes to the work product,' . . . had traditionally been included
in calculation of the lawyer's hourly rates. '2 5 Justice Scalia further re-
lied on the fact that "[t]here was also no record in Jenkins-as there is
a lengthy record here-of statutory usage that recognizes a distinction
between the charges at issue and attorney's fees."'2 Finally, the Casey
majority refused to read a provision for expert witness fees recovery
into Section 1988 on the theory that Congress simply overlooked or for-
got about the issue:
Where what is at issue is not a contradictory disposition within the same enact-
ment, but merely a difference between the more parsimonious policy of an earlier
enactment and the more generous policy of a later one, there is no more basis for
saying that the earlier Congress forgot than for saying that the earlier Congress felt
differently. In such circumstances, the attribution of forgetfulness rests in reality
upon the judge's assessment that the later statute contains the better disposition.
But that is not for judges to prescribe.
27
B. Legal Context, Purpose, and a Critique of the Opinion
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Casey states that any "inconsis-
tency of policy" regarding the shifting of expert witness fees is Con-
gress's fault and that it is not the function of the Court "to treat alike
subjects that different Congresses have chosen to treat differently."
2 8
But this attribution of responsibility grossly mischaracterizes Con-
gress's long-standing policy that successful civil rights plaintiffs be able
to recover the costs of vindicating their rights. Indeed, it has been the
25. Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285). Fidelity to plain meaning,
however, would seem to dictate that paralegals are not lawyers and that nontestimonial experts are
not witnesses.
26. Id. at 1147. Justice Scalia noted: "We do not know of a single statute that shifts clerk or
paralegal fees separately." Id. This reasoning strongly illustrates the Court's elevation of consis-
tency of statutory usage over effectuation of congressional intent.
27. Id. at 1148. We argue that Justice Scalia's attribution to Congress of inconsistent policies
of generosity and parsimony is no less a form of activism than the attribution of forgetfulness he so
forcefully rejects. Given the choice between the conclusion that the earlier Congress either forgot
to include an expert fees provision or did not deem the inclusion of such a provision necessary (a
choice that permits the statute to work in a sensible manner) and the conclusion that the earlier
Congress felt differently (a choice that is unsupported by the legislative history and that frustrates
the purpose of the statute), we see no reason to choose the latter. Indeed, Scalia's observation that
"there is no more basis for saying that the earlier Congress felt differently" does not provide a
basis for saying that the earlier Congress felt differently. The "plain meaning" doctrine, which
Scalia invokes to reach the "felt differently" result, is a judicial construct that purports to ask
"what did Congress say?" but really asks "what rule of statutory interpretation will work most
efficiently for the Court within the framework of separation of powers?" Scalia, of course, com-
pletely spurns the question "what did Congress mean?"
28. Id.
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Court's interventions in fee award cases that have imposed incoherence
on clear congressional policies.29
The Supreme Court's first intrusion came in Alyeska,30 which rep-
resented a fundamental departure from then-existing practices regard-
ing fee-shifting in civil rights cases. An examination of the pre-Alyeska
fee-recovery landscape in civil rights cases reveals a patchwork of statu-
tory fee- recovery provisions augmented by judicial exercise of equitable
power in nonstatutory fee-shifting cases that produced a rough uni-
formity of result: prevailing civil rights plaintiffs successfully recovered
fees and costs.
The very first federal attorney's fees statute arose in the civil rights
area. The 1870 Enforcement Act provided protection for voting rights
and included three provisions for fees recovery.3 1 When Alyeska was
decided, however, the civil rights statutes of comparable vintage-the
post- Civil War statutes32-did not include fee-shifting provisions.
More recent civil rights statutes did provide explicitly for fee-shifting,
33
although they did not address expert witness fees.3 4 Nonetheless, the
widespread pre-Alyeska assumption was that prevailing plaintiffs in
civil rights cases could recover expert witness fees, either as part of
costs or as part of attorney's fees. Courts often were not precise, but
many thought it clear that fee-shifting practices in civil rights cases
were intended to reimburse prevailing plaintiffs in a "make-whole"
29. See generally Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The
Supreme Court, Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 291 (1990).
30. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
31. Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (§§ 2, 3, and 12), repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 1894, 28
Stat. 36.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, 1985-86.
33. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. II, § 204, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 244, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000 a- 3(b) (1988) (prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations); Id. tit. VII,
§ 701, codified at, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(k) (prohibiting discrimination in employment); Civil Rights
Act of 1968 tit. VIII, § 812, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 88, current version codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3612 (prohibiting discrimination in housing).
34. The absence of specific fee-shifting provisions for expert services would not surprise any-
one familiar with the development of civil rights litigation. Although the use of expert witnesses is
not a new phenomenon, see, for example, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483,
494 n. 11, experts were once less integral to the successful presentation of a civil rights case. In de
jure school desegregation cases, voting rights cases in which crude practices were employed to de-
prive racial minorities of the right to vote, and employment discrimination cases in which appli-
cants were overtly excluded from the work force, establishing liability did not involve sophisticated
statistical analyses. As Judge Sobeloff of the Fourth Circuit once observed: "Overt bias, when pro-
hibited, has often times been supplanted by more cunning devices designed to impart the appear-
ance of neutrality, but to operate with the same invidious effect as before." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1238 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
recent years, as overt discrimination has become less common, and especially as the courts have
demanded higher standards of proof in civil rights cases, expert witness testimony has become
more crucial.
694
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manner.3 5 Typically a court might award fees in the amount of $X and
costs in the amount of $Y. Alternatively a court might award $X in
costs and fees or $X in attorney's fees, $Y in costs, and $Z in expert
witness fees. Neither Congress nor the lower courts (or for that matter,
the pre-Alyeska Supreme Court) found these formulations to be fatally
deficient.
As Justice Scalia acknowledged in Casey, "prior to [Alyeska] many
courts awarded expert fees and attorney's fees in certain circumstances
pursuant to their equitable discretion." 6 Although the Casey decision
minimized the significance of that prior practice, the Court, in fact, was
not unfamiliar with it. In Bradley v. School Board of Richmond 7 the
district court had awarded "$43,355 for services rendered . . . and ex-
penses of $13,064.65." s Noting "the absence at that time of any explicit
statutory authorization for an award of fees in school desegregation ac-
tions," the Supreme Court upheld the award, relying on its general eq-
uity powers and citing numerous precedents in school desegregation
cases.3 9 Pre-Alyeska courts also exercised this equitable discretion
within the context of other fee-shifting provisions; although such stat-
utes contained no explicit reference to expert witness fees, the practice
was to allow their recovery.4"
Aleyska, of course, was quickly followed by the enactment of Sec-
tion 1988. Fully in line with the plain congressional design, the lower
courts interpreted the statute as restoring the status quo ante for suc-
cessful civil rights litigants. Thus, prevailing plaintiffs continued to re-
cover expert witness fees as they had before Alyeska. In Jenkins v.
35. "Under the Civil Rights Act [42 U.S.C. § 1983] courts are required fully to remedy an
established wrong . . . and the payment of fees and expenses in class actions like this one is a
necessary ingredient of such a remedy." Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, Va., 53 F.R.D.
28, 42 (E.D. Va. 1971) (citation omitted). "Fees for expert witnesses' testimony likewise will be
allowed as an expense of suit. It is difficult to imagine a more necessary item of proof (and source
of assistance to the Court) than the considered opinion of an educational expert." Id. at 44.
36. Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1146. See also Bradley, 53 F.R.D. at 42.
37. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
38. Id. at 705-06.
39. Id. at 706 n.9, citing Brewer v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 456 F.2d 943, 951-52 (4th
Cir.) (1972); Nesbit v. Statesville City Bd. of Education, 418 F.2d 1040, 1043 (4th Cir. 1969);
Williams v. Kimbrough, 415 F.2d 874, 875 (5th Cir. 1969); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Education of
Lincoln County, 391 F.2d 77, 81 (6th Cir. 1968); Clark v. Board of Education of Little Rock, 369
F.2d 661, 670-71 (8th Cir. 1966); Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 363 F.2d
206 (4th Cir.) (1966); Bell v. School Bd. of Powhatan County, 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963).
40. See, for example, the Education Amendments of 1972, tit. VII, § 718, Pub. L. No. 92-318,
86 Stat. 369, repealed by the Education Amendments of 1978, tit. VI, § 601(b)(2), Pub. L. No. 95-
561, 92 Stat. 2268. In Swann v. Charlotte- Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483, 486
(W.D.N.C. 1975), the district court awarded $175,000 to plaintiffs, including $29,072.33 in ex-
penses, which in turn (although not specified by the court) included expert witness fees.
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Missouri,41 in which the Court held that paralegal and law clerk ex-
penses could be recovered as part of attorney's fees under Section 1988,
the court of appeals had affirmed the district court's award of
$4,053,015.66 in "fees and expenses." This amount included not only
the expenses at issue before the Court, but also expert witness fees.2
In voting rights cases as well, the pre-Casey assumption was that
expert witness fees were fully recoverable by prevailing plaintiffs. The
assumption was so ingrained that some defendants did not even contest
motions for reimbursement of expert witness fees and expenses. Thus,
in a 1988 unreported order on plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and
expenses in Major v. Treen,43 a Louisiana reapportionment case, the
district court noted that the State of Louisiana did not initially dispute
$27,581.49 the plaintiffs had requested for expert and professional ser-
vices; the State in fact had stipulated to at least $18,256.49 of that
amount.
44
In Casey Justice Scalia denied the significance of the prior practice
of awarding expert fees and, instead, adopted the formalistic methodol-
ogy of simply comparing the language of Section 1988 with that of other
fee-shifting statutes. The fact that some of these statutes explicitly re-
ferred to expert fees, while Section 1988 did not, was sufficient to carry
the day under a "plain meaning" approach. But we believe that a more
thoughtful analysis would understand the linguistic variations in a dif-
ferent manner.
Justice Scalia failed to offer any reason why Congress would treat
civil rights plaintiffs differently from other successful litigants with re-
spect to expert witness fees recovery. Perhaps, this failure is best ex-
plained by the difficulty of coming up with a convincing-or even
plausible-basis for such a distinction. Congress has specifically pro-
vided civil rights plaintiffs with the ability to recover attorney's fees to
vindicate rights that have special societal importance. Why, then, would
it single out civil rights plaintiffs and deny them expert witness fee re-
covery while allowing such recovery by plaintiffs in antitrust, securities,
and other categories of cases? Given courts' pre-Alyeska practice of
awarding attorney's fees and not treating expert witness fees separately,
it was logical for Congress to enact ameliorative legislation that left un-
41. 491 U.S. 437 (1987).
42. Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Missouri, 838 F.2d 260, 266 (8th Cir. 1988) (rejecting Mis-
souri's objection to reimbursement for expert witness fees).
43. No. 82-1192, unreported order (E.D. La. Sep. 16, 1988) (on file with the Authors).
44. Id. at 45-46. Ultimately the stipulation was withdrawn, and the court denied recovery of
expert fees. Id. at 46. In denying the recovery, the court relied on the then-recent Fifth Circuit
decision in International Woodworkers of America v. Champion International Corp., 790 F.2d
1174 (5th Cir. 1986). Champion was the companion case to Casey.
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touched the existing civil rights statutes with attorney's fees provisions
and that was consistent with earlier provisions in not specifically
enumerating expert witness fees recovery. Indeed, in drafting Section
1988, Congress mirrored the language of Title VII in an obvious at-
tempt to follow the established tradition with respect to fees recovery.
Alyeska did not address expert witness fees recovery, and neither did
Congress in Section 1988. Had Congress done so, Section 1988 might
have been interpreted as a provision for expert fees recovery under only
the statutes enumerated in Section 1988 and, thus, as a departure from
the pre-Alyeska practice of allowing expert witness fees-shifting in
other civil rights cases. Why would Congress open up an area in which
it saw no problem with the pre-existing statutory interpretation and ju-
dicial practice? It seems senseless for the courts to ignore or frustrate a
clearly discernable statutory scheme and purpose simply because Con-
gress, for context-specific or idiosyncratic reasons, has adopted varying
linguistic formulas in related statutes in other ares of law. The principle
of judicial deference surely does not dictate such a result.
In sum, the Court's opinion in Casey is subject to both a "vertical"
critique (that it ignores the easy-to-read history of Section 1988) and a
"horizontal" critique (that it is simply not plausible that Congress
would award expert fees in other areas of the law but intentionally deny
them in civil rights cases covered by Section 1988). Congress has per-
sistently pursued the policy of ensuring that plaintiffs are able to re-
cover the cost of maintaining successful civil rights actions. The
accomplishment of this rather straightforward goal has been made diffi-
cult by the Supreme Court, which has thrice created incoherence in the
set of legal norms and remedies. Alyeska threatened civil rights en-
forcement by knocking out fee awards in cases brought under the Con-
stitution or federal statutes not expressly providing for fee shifting.
Congress quickly acted to restore coherence by enacting Section 1988.
Under Section 1988, courts returned to the pre-Alyeska practice of
awarding both attorney and expert fees in civil rights cases. Then in
Crawford Fitting the Court limited recovery of expert costs to $30 per
day (now $40), forcing successful plaintiffs to request expert fees as
part of attorney's fee awards authorized under Section 1988. Casey put
a stop to this practice, for the third time disrupting civil rights enforce-
ment efforts. Again, Congress acted quickly to return to a coherent fee-
shifting policy, overturning some of the effects of Casey in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991." Advocates of "plain meaning" may feel vindicated
by Congress's actions: the interpretive strategy lodges law- making
45. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 113, Pub. L. No. 102- 166, 105 Stat. 1071.
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power in Congress, not the courts,46 and any judicial "errors" may be
corrected quickly. But there are substantial costs to court-induced inco-
herence. Legislative "corrections" do not come easily. Indeed, civil
rights groups were able to overturn Casey only for employment discrim-
ination cases. Moreover, even when legislative action is accomplished, it
requires the spending of political capital that otherwise could be in-
vested elsewhere. While the wheels of Congress turn, civil rights en-
forcement suffers. All this from a theory of interpretation justified on
the ground of legislative supremacy!
III. ANTI-ANTI-ANTI PLAIN MEANING AND THE NORM OF DUE PROCESS
OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
We will not review here a number of the traditional defenses of a
"plain meaning" approach, nor will we address the usual parries of the
critics of literalism.47 The preceding section, however, provides interest-
ing data on one of the strongest modern defenses of "plain meaning"
(and one pressed particularly strenuously by Justice Scalia)-that a lit-
eral interpretation avoids reliance on manufactured and manipulated
legislative history.4 8 We believe that we have told a coherent and credi-
ble story of the history of Section 1988 that supports awards of expert
witness fees to prevailing civil rights plaintiffs. That story can be told
without recourse to committee hearings or reports or statements made
on the floor of the House or Senate. The evidence we have ex-
amined-prior statutes and judicial practice under those statutes-is
hardly "manipulable" in the sense complained about by Justice Scalia.
We believe such instances of positive law may permissibly be consulted
in trying to make sense of a legal text that must take its place among
the other legal texts that constitute our legal system (and our system of
protecting civil rights).
Professor Frederick Schauer recently has offered a defense of
"plain meaning" that focuses not on faults in the legislative process but
rather on the decisionmaking process of the Court. "The reliance on
plain meaning," Schauer suggests, "substitutes a second-best coordinat-
ing solution for a theoretically optimizing but likely self- defeating
46. See Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1148.
47. Contrast Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983), Ken-
neth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 Duke L. J. 371, and Quin-
tin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1 (1954),
with John M. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 Dalhousie L. J. 333
(1976) and Julius Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning,
36 Ind. L. J. 414 (1961).
48. Such concern is not simply the province of the "plain meaning" crowd. See, for example,
Eskridge, 37 UCLA L. Rev. at 684-88 (cited in note 5).
[Vol. 45:687
COSTS OF INCOHERENCE
search for first-best solutions by multiple decisionmakers with different
goals and different perspectives."49 Why might the justices settle for
second-best? Because statutory cases are hard and boring: to get inside
a statutory scheme requires a "context- sensitive expertise" that the
Court is unlikely to be interested in developing. ("Context," Schauer
remarks, "is not for dabblers.") 50 Thus,
If we take as a given the relative unwillingness of the Justices to get totally in-
volved in the detailed ramifications of the cases involved, or take as an alternative
given the likelihood that were they to do so a great deal of disagreement would
result, then the reliance on plain meaning may be a hardly novel suboptimizing
second-best solution, a way in which people with potentially divergent views and
potentially different understandings of what the context would require may still be
able to agree about what the language they all share requires.
51
Schauer appropriately concedes that this defense of "plain mean-
ing" requires that the justices be seeking agreement on a methodology.
He posits that it is at least plausible that the justices are "people who
both want to agree in fact and want to be seen as people who agree with
some frequency. ' 52 But Schauer carefully hedges his analysis. He sug-
gests only that if we focus our attention on the question of what an
appropriate decision process for a fractured multi-member body might
be, "then the admitted limitations of plain meaning need no longer be
considered dispositive. ' 53 This is hardly ringing support for "plain
meaning," but it does raise a set of issues that opponents of "plain
meaning" have largely ignored.
Nevertheless, we find Schauer's analysis unsatisfying. First, how
persuasive is the underlying descriptive claim that appears in Schauer's
essay and much of the recent scholarship-that "plain meaning" is be-
ginning to dominate the Court's statutory cases? While we have not
done a full-blown statistical analysis, casual empiricism supports the
claim that "plain meaning" language is showing up more in the Court's
work. But what one should make of this is far from clear. We believe
that it means much less than most commentators think it means. That
is, only for certain justices will a "plain meaning" approach fully cut off
analysis of statutory structure or purpose. In most cases, "plain mean-
ing" is fully consistent with-indeed, indicates acceptance of-a pur-
pose approach. Let us explain this mildly paradoxical assertion.
Schauer is no doubt correct that there is a high degree of certainty
about the meaning of most speech acts. We do regularly communicate
with fair precision. It would be surprising were it otherwise. Human
49. Schauer, 1990 S. Ct. Rev. at 232 (cited in note 5).
50. Id. at 253.
51. Id. at 254.
52. Id. at 255.
53. Id. at 256.
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beings are clever enough to create language systems that allow each of
us to let others of us know what is on our minds. We use that metaphor
("on our minds") intentionally here. Language is largely instrumental
(and statutory language is decidedly so), and it would be curious if our
language was not up to the task of rather clearly expressing what we
intend to say.
The import of these rather banal observations is that when Con-
gress wants to accomplish something badly enough to pass a statute
about it, Congress quite likely will seek and be able to find words that
rather clearly express what it wishes to accomplish. That is, "plain
meaning" is more than likely to reflect fairly closely the underlying pur-
poses of the statute. Why would Congress write statutes any other
way?54 This commonsensical claim is reflected in the Court's near-ca-
nonical statement: "[W]e assume 'that the legislative purpose is ex-
pressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' "" This statement
is sensible but not for the reason assigned to it by "plain meaning" ad-
vocates- that such a presumption must be made in order to maintain
legislative supremacy and a theory of positive law. It is sensible because
rational people interested in ordering others about are likely to choose
language that brings with it a high degree of probability that their or-
ders will be understood as intended.
What this means is that a theory of interpretation fully dedicated
to carrying out the underlying purposes of a statute would be foolhardy
to ignore "plain meaning." But "plain meaning" would yield to a purpo-
sive analysis when contrary statutory purposes can be identified. This
rendering of a purpose approach, interestingly enough, is exactly what
Schauer purports to have discovered in the Court's recent statutory
cases: frequent appeal to "plain meaning" and "presumptive" weight
attached to such meaning. The real test of whether "plain meaning" has
come to dominate the Court, therefore, is not the number of times the
phrase appears in the Court's opinions, but rather the number of times
"plain meaning" is dispositive in the face of identifiable opposing
purposes.
From this perspective, the cases upon which Schauer relies may be
seen in dramatically different light. For, despite frequent invocations of
the "plain meaning" canon, in none of these cases does the Court rely
54. Of course, Congress sometimes may have reasons for writing less than pellucid prose:
ambiguous language may permit opposing interests to claim victory, and hard-to- follow texts may
hide private-regarding pay-offs.
55. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (quoting Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962)). See also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (stating
that "when words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the legislative
intent").
[Vol. 45:687
19921 COSTS OF INCOHERENCE
on plain meaning in the face of statutory purposes that point in an op-
posite direction. Typically, the "plain meaning" reading is shown to
conform to underlying statutory purposes discoverable in the overall
statutory structure, 6 legislative history, 7 or broader policies. 5 What is
missing from the bulk of the cases is the "opacity" that Schauer pur-
ports to find." Statutory language may not be fully "transparent to"
underlying purposes and policy concerns in the sense that the text sim-
ply serves as a window, noticed only for what it frames; but certainly
the cases, carefully read, demonstrate a great deal of translucency-a
text illuminated by background purposes and policies. Thus, Schauer's
conclusion that "plain meaning appears now for all of the justices to be
a strong factor in their decisionmaking" 60 is only the beginning of the
analysis. Indeed, to state, as Schauer does, that "plain meaning" is a
"presumptive factor" is implicitly to recognize the role that other fac-
tors- here, primarily statutory purpose-continue to play." We are all
Hart and Sacksians after all, it seems.62
56. See, for example, John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 157 (1989) (noting
that in interpreting the Freedom of Information Act, the Court has sought a "workable balance
between the interests of the public in greater access to information and the needs of the Govern-
ment to protect certain kinds of information from disclosure"); Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S.
411 (1990); Sullivan v. Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990).
57. See, for example, California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271 (1990); Kaiser Alumi-
num & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1575 (1990) (holding that, "in light of the
plain language and the absence of legislative intent to the contrary," postjudgement interest runs
from the date of entry of the judgment).
58. See, for example, Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82 (1990) (a § 1988 case!); Yellow Freight
System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990); Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) (em-
ploying the general policy reflected in the rule of lenity); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990). Although in Guidry the Court rejects an interpretation that
seems naturally just, it does so not on the basis simply of plain meaning, but on basis that the
provision at issue "reflects a considered congressional policy choice" and other policy considera-
tions. Id. at 376.
59. Schauer, 1990 S. Ct. Rev. at 237 (cited in note 5).
60. Id. at 249.
61. Id. (emphasis added). This is not to say that some true plain meaning cases cannot be
found. See, for example, United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985). But the universal criticism of
Locke demonstrates that it is the plain meaning exception that proves the purpose rule. See; for
example, Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 204-05 (1987).
62. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Modera-
tion as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 707, 726-37 (1991).
The interpretive strategy, found in some of the cases, that comes closest to a pure plain mean-
ing approach focuses on how the bit of text at issue fits with other provisions and phrases in the
statute as a whole. This kind of reading, which seeks internal coherence within the statute, may
occur with little or no recourse to "purpose" discussion. See, for example, Department of Trea-
sury, IRS v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 494 U.S. 922 (1990). Of course, what is happening
in these cases is that the Court can find no reason in the structure of the statute to disregard the
statute's "plain meaning"-again, an implicit recognition that "plain meaning" is simply the first
step, and not the goal, of statutory interpretation.
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Now, as to Schauer's normative musings. As an initial matter, there
is something quite curious about a theory of interpretation prescrip-
tively grounded in the desire to avoid work. 3 And given the number of
clerks and briefs available to the Court, it seems that a Justice can
rather quickly "get up to speed" on a difficult statute. There is also no
reason why individual justices might not specialize in particular areas of
the law and be delegated the responsibility for writing the opinions of
the Court in cases arising in such areas.
Furthermore, it is far from clear to us that the Court either seeks
or needs to seek agreement on methodological questions. (What, after
all, is a dissent for?) The Court is not a football team that needs to get
its signals straight in order to compete effectively, nor is it a set of
negotiators who all must agree on a result before a deal can be consum-
mated. Even if the Court did seek agreement-in the context of com-
plex or boring cases-it might just as well say to the Justice unlucky
enough to be assigned a statutory opinion: "Go discover the purposes
and do the best you can. We'll sign on. (And, besides, if we get it wrong
there are always the law reviews, not to mention Congress, standing
ready to correct us.)"
64
It is also apparent that the "boring and hard" justification for a
"plain meaning" approach to statutes is wildly over-inclusive. Many of
the statutory cases decided by the Court fall well within its areas of
expertise.6 5 Interestingly enough, Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel En-
tertainment Groups s (Schauer's show case) concerned interpretation of
63. Compare this theory with Justice Scalia's comments in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991) (Scalia dissenting), discussing the deference owed to an agency's inter-
pretation of a statute under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984):
Deference is appropriate where the relevant language, carefully considered, can yield more
than one reasonable interpretation, not where discerning the only possible interpretation re-
quires a taxing inquiry. Chevron is a recognition that the ambiguities in statutes are to be
resolved by the agencies charged with implementing them, not a declaration that, when statu-
tory construction becomes difficult, we will throw up our hands and let regulatory agencies do
it for us.
111 S. Ct. at 2539.
64. If there is agreement on a "plain meaning" methodology, it may be based on motivations
different from those identified by Schauer. Thus, "liberal" Justices may seek to maintain the dom-
inant position of (a Democratic) Congress (as against "conservative" courts); "conservative" Jus-
tices may seek to limit judicial activism and discipline Congress. On the whole, however, we agree
with Schauer that the choice for a theory of interpretation probably is not linked in any strong
way with these kinds of political considerations.
65. For example, cases involving interpretations of rules of procedure certainly fall within the
Court's expertise as do several of the cases cited by Schauer. See, for example, Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct.
1570 (involving calculation of postjudgment interest); Venegas, 495 U.S. 82 (interpreting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988); Hughey, 495 U.S. 411 (determining restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection
Act).
66. 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. So too, the issue in
Casey-what kind of fees and costs should be awarded to prevailing
parties- traditionally has been a judicial question, turning on court-
created rules of equity. Furthermore, the Court frequently has found
itself excited about statutory cases. The Civil Rights Act of 19917 was a
direct response to a number of Supreme Court cases interpreting anti-
discrimination statutes to which the Court appeared to have devoted an
enormous amount of energy and thought." Interestingly, these cases in-
volved issues in which the courts have substantial expertise, 69 and in
only one was the "plain meaning" of the statutory language given much
weight.
70
Thus, as a descriptive matter, it may be that the Court applies
"plain meaning" in complex, unfamiliar statutory realms (although our
review of the cases above suggests that even this claim is harder to sus-
tain than one might suppose). But the normative defense suggested by
Schauer is hardly strong enough to sustain any such practice across the
board in statutory cases.
Finally, we are deeply troubled by a defense of a theory of statu-
tory interpretation that pays so little attention to the way in which
statutes function, and ought to function, in our legal system. Statutes
are purposive, instrumental acts, crafted (usually 1 ) to have an impact
on the real world. To be sure, not all the intended effects of legislation
may be "wealth maximizing." Power, greed, ignorance, and mistake
may produce "bad" legislation, and theories of interpretation sensibly
may seek to appeal to other purposes of statutes. 2 But to say this is
hardly to deny that interpreters (or more appropriately: appliers) of a
statute ought to be unconcerned with the legislation's real-world effects.
67. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
68. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
69. For example, Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 642 (determining the appropriate standard and bur-
den of proof in Title VII cases); Martin, 490 U.S. 755 (setting the standards for re- opening court-
sanctioned settlements of civil rights actions); Lorance, 490 U.S. 900 (interpreting Title VII's stat-
ute of limitations).
70. Patterson, interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981, was the only case in which the Court purported
to adopt the plain meaning of the statutory language. It seems clear, however, that statutory poli-
cies-particularly the relationship of § 1981 to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-played an
important role in the decision of the Court. 491 U.S., at 180-82.
71. Arguably some statutes are intended simply to have a "symbolic" effect. See, for exam-
ple, Murray J. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (U. Ill., 1964); Kitty Calavita, Employer
Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White- Collar Crime, 24 Law & Soc. Rev.
1041 (1990).
72. See, for example, Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest-Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223 (1986); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985).
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Certainly the Congress that drafted the statute was intensely concerned
about such issues. Why should those who actually bring the statute to
bear on society not be similarly concerned?
For us, two considerations follow. First, we propose a meta-canon
of construction that requires courts to identify some plausible purpose
(or purposes) consistent with their reading of the statutory language.
We call this constraint "due process of statutory interpretation." Sec-
ond, we believe that an evaluation of consequences ought to carry inter-
pretive weight. We will discuss each in turn.
Just as courts considering the constitutionality of a legislative en-
actment assure themselves that the act passes a rational basis test, so
too courts ought to assure themselves that their statutory interpretation
(which itself constitutes law-making) is also supported by a rational ba-
sis. A conscientious judge, we believe, would ask him or herself: "Is my
tentative reading of the statute consistent with a purpose that makes
sense within our legal system?" This is not the same as adopting a pur-
pose approach. The inquiry is not, what purpose does this piece of legis-
lation attempt to further, nor is it how one interpretation or another
would serve or frustrate those purposes. Rather, the question is whether
a plausible purpose can be ascribed to the judge's reading of the statute
(whether or not that purpose can be identified as having motivated the
statute's enactment)."
Plausibility would not be established simply by the fact that an
interpreter's reading of a statutory provision makes linguistic sense.
Thus, reading "no vehicles in the park" to include baby carriages is not
plausible, despite the fact that the reading is "good English." As Llew-
ellyn stated: "If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light
of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no
purpose or objective, is nonsense. '7 4 Nonsense does not satisfy the con-
straints of due process of statutory interpretation. A court would test
plausibility by looking outward from the statutory language (just as the
due process requirement of a "rational basis" requires a showing that a
statutory classification can be explained by reference to a permissible
purpose beyond the classification itself 5 ). Some connection must be
73. To give an example, take the recent criminal prosecutions for "delivery of drugs" by
pregnant women to fetuses. No one claims that the purpose of the statute was to cover such con-
duct. Yet one could conclude that finding criminal liability is consistent with a purpose of deter-
ring drug use and protecting fetuses. This, of course, is not to answer the question of statutory
meaning; it is simply to say that such a reading would pass our due process test.
74. Llewellyn, 3 Vand. L. Rev. at 400 (cited in note 1). See also Posner, 37 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. at 204, 208 (cited in note 61) (rejecting the Court's plain meaning reading of the statute in
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985), because no "rational purpose" could be ascribed to a
literal interpretation of the statutory language).
75. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
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made between the reading given the statutory language and other legal
materials-such as statutory structure, the legal landscape-or the real
world.
This is, quite clearly, a rather low level of review. 76 Yet what is so
startling about Justice Scalia's opinion in Casey is its utter failure even
to attempt this exercise in rational justification. Noting that his reading
of Section 1988 "prevents ... accommodation" with the provision and
the corpus juris of which it is a part, Justice Scalia seems content to
state that "different Congresses have chosen to treat [different fee situ-
ations] differently. '77 He may be correct, but the crucial question is
why might this be so? If an interpreter cannot come up with a plausible
explanation for such disparate treatment, then it seems sensible to us
that the statute ought to be construed in another manner-in a way
that furthers some purpose that plausibly might be ascribed to the
overall statutory structure and rationally connected to the world in
which it operates.78
As we have detailed above, we cannot find a good reason why ex-
pert fees should not be awarded in civil rights cases, particularly in
light of the many areas in which Congress explicitly has provided for
such cost shifting.79 Furthermore, we have developed a coherent ac-
count of why Section 1988 might not have specifically listed witness
fees as recoverable. In short, a reading of Section 1988 as permitting the
award of expert witness fees (and even the omission of any specific pro-
vision from the language of the statute) serves identifiable, plausible
purposes. In light of the statute's history and current legal norms the
denial of such fees seems irrational.80
76. Even this low level of review would rule out impermissible purposes such as unconstitu-
tional discrimination or a simple desire to harm another group. See United States Dep't of Agri-
culture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). It would also reject absurd results. See United States
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). Purposes that seem at war with purposes
evident elsewhere in the statute or society might also fail a rational basis scrutiny. See Bob Jones
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
77. Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 1148. "Chosen" here clearly is given a fictive meaning (as, perhaps is
"Congress").
78. See Judge Posner's opinion in Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1989).
In noting that the amendment to § 1988 was not a "compromise" (those seeking all kinds of fees
did not bargain with opponents and settle on a deal of attorney's fees but not expert fees), Judge
Posner implicitly rejects perhaps the only plausible reason for reading § 1988 as the Court does in
Casey. Id. at 518.
79. Note that the "due process" requirement goes beyond floating a purpose over just the
particular statutory provision. Thus, a court could conclude, based on the language of the statute
alone, that a reading of § 1988 which excludes expert fee awards serves the purpose of giving some
incentive to civil rights plaintiffs without overburdening the defendants. But this reading must be
rejected if other evidence makes this purpose implausible.
80. Professor Daniel Farber has suggested to us that Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989), may provide another example of a violation of "due process of statutory interpre-
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The second glaring absence in Scalia's opinion is the lack of any
discussion of the consequences of his reading of Section 1988. It is to
those consequences that we now turn.
IV. THE COSTS OF INCOHERENCE
The development of fee-shifting law accompanied the rise of in-
creasingly complex civil rights litigation. For decades after Brown v.
Board of Education,1 plaintiffs' efforts in the school desegregation
cases focused on winning meaningful substantive relief that would take
Brown beyond rhetoric. The federal government, through administra-
tive proceedings brought by the Office of Civil Rights of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare and through Justice
Department lawsuits, relieved private plaintiffs in many jurisdictions
from bearing the full burden of litigation. Nevertheless, when private
plaintiffs did bring actions, their lawyers often worked without compen-
sation, sometimes for years. The complexity of the desegregation cases
necessitated extensive use of expert testimony"2 and accordingly,
tation." We agree. Patterson, too, was overturned by the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
Our due process norm is related to, but not the same as, the familiar claim that an interpreter
ought to adopt a reading of a statute that fits within the prevailing "legal landscape." Llewellyn,
writing in a decidedly Hart-and- Sacksian mode, put it this way:
[A] court must strive to make sense as a whole out of our law as a whole. It must. . . take
the music of any statute as written by the legislature; it must take the text of the play as
written by the legislature. But there are many ways to play that music, to play that play, and
a court's duty is to play it well, and in harmony with the other music of the legal system....
If a statute is to be merged into a going system of law, moreover, the court must do the
merging, and must in so doing take account of the policy of the statute-or else substitute its
own version of such policy. Creative reshaping of the net result is thus inevitable.
Llewellyn, 3 Vand. L. Rev. at 399-40 (cited in note 1).
To some, this is an inappropriate norm because it is, in their view, likely to be impossible to
meet, or, in any event, it licenses too much judicial discretion. Both objections flow from a descrip-
tion of our legal system as embodying a plethora of competing and conflicting norms. (This, in-
deed, is the point behind the "thrust but parry" list.) We agree with Llewellyn's position-so does
Justice Scalia! (at least where the words are ambiguous, see Casey, 111 S. Ct. at 114)-but we will
not make that case here.
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educa-
tion, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), experts played a more limited role in school desegregation cases. Most
desegregation plans were relatively simplistic and ineffective. They employed "freedom of choice"
plans of the kind found to be constitutionally insufficient in Green v. County School Bd. of New
Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437- 41 (1968) and its companion cases, Raney v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 433 (1968) and Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968). None of these cases
contained any reference to expert witnesses, nor did any of the major Supreme Court cases decided
between Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), and Swann. See Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958); Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963); Griffin v. County School
Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964); Bradley v. School Bd. of
Richmond, 382 U.S. 103 (1965); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Education, 396 U.S. 19
(1969).
In Swann the Supreme Court affirmed a desegregation plan drawn by a court appointed ex-
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brought significant financial pressure to bear on plaintiffs and their
lawyers. Not surprisingly, fee recovery assumed great urgency.
By no means has the proliferation of expert witnesses in civil rights
actions been limited to the school desegregation cases. Expert witnesses
have been essential to employment discrimination cases from Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.83 through Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio84 Today,
it would be unthinkable for plaintiffs to try a voting rights case without
expert witness services. Indeed, the very standards established by the
pert. 402 U.S. at 8-11, 25. In post-Swann desegregation cases it became a common and often neces-
sary practice for plaintiffs to retain their own experts for both liability and remedial purposes. In
recent years school desegregation cases have become a battle between experts. The cases exempli-
fying this phenomenon are too voluminous to cite, but include Riddick v. School Bd. of City of
Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 526-27 (4th Cir. 1986) (referring to four experts retained by defendants and
to an opposing expert); Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District, 778
F.2d 404, 420, 424 (8th Cir. 1985) (first referring to expert testimony regarding" the interdistrict
effects of boundary-line drawing and later referring to expert testimony regarding school siting
decisions and numerous other issues in the case); id. at 422 (referring to the plaintiffs' expert
testimony regarding the racial effects of the Educable Mentally Retarded classification); id. at 428,
n.16 (referring to the plaintiffs' expert witness testimony regarding interdistrict segregation effects
of various discriminatory acts); id. at 432 (referring to plaintiff-intervenors' expert testimony re-
garding remedy); Liddell v. State of Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1303 (8th Cir. 1984) (referring to the
testimony of the defendant's expert witness and to the plaintiff's expert witness textimony regard-
ing the remedy); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Education, 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1337, 1347
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (referring to the defendant City of Yonker's urban planning expert and to the
government's urban planning expert); id. at 1347 (referring to the testimony of a HUD economist);
id. at 1365 (referring to plaintiffs' housing expert and to a housing and school desegregation ex-
pert); id. at 1366 (referring to the city-defendant's urban economic expert); id. at 1393 (referring to
defendant Yonkers Board of Education's statistical and sociological expert); Jenkins by Agyei v.
State of Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 667 n.14, 674 (8th Cir. 1986) (referring to "plaintiff's expert histo-
rian" and to plaintiff's demographic experts); id. at 678 (referring to plaintiff's expert).
The latter two cases exemplify just how complex school desegregation cases have become and
the extent to which expert testimony is pivotal. The Yonkers opinion is 277 pages in length, a
substantial portion of which is devoted to discussing expert testimony. It, like Jenkins, encom-
passes housing discrimination claims that have become crucial elements of school desegregation
cases. See also Dowell v. Oklahoma City Bd. of Ed., 396 U.S. 269 (1969). The plaintiffs in Yonkers
included the government and the NAACP. Although the Justice Department ordinarily cannot
recover attorney's fees in civil rights cases, its utilization of experts is instructive insofar as it
reveals how essential they are and the extent of the resources necessary to litigate these actions
properly.
83. 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd in part, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (referring to the
defendant company's expert witness); id. at 1244 (Sobeloff dissenting in part) (referring to the
plaintiff's "testing and selection" expert witness).
84. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Neither the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove nor the Ninth
Circuit's opinions below made reference to expert witnesses. See id.; 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985),
vacated when the court agreed to rehear argument en banc, 787 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985), decided
at 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987). Yet the Supreme Court's discussion of the requisite proof in
employment discrimination cases leaves no doubt that sophisticated statistical analysis of the kind
requiring expert witness services is essential. Plaintiffs' counsel in Wards Cove confirmed that he
utilized four experts at trial (two testified regarding statistical analyses and two testified regarding
job qualifications) and that the defendants engaged in an even more extensive use of experts. Tele-
phone interview with Abraham A. Arditi, attorney for plaintiffs (Jan. 7, 1992).
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Supreme Court for such cases mandate that expert services be used,
and judicial opinions reflect the crucial role played by expert wit-
nesses.8 5 Expert witness testimony (from demographers, sociologists,
and economists) is also crucial in complex housing discrimination
cases.8 6 Although less common, plaintiffs increasingly use experts even
in simple housing discrimination cases. Experts on the practice of test-
ing may be helpful in establishing liability, and psychologists sometimes
are used to establish the basis for damage awards.8 "
Casey's preclusion of expert witness fees recovery will have a sig-
85. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 52-58 (1986) (recounting an analysis by plaintiffs'
expert, Dr. Bernard Grofman, and setting forth the standard for legally significant racial bloc vot-
ing). The district court opinion in Gingles included a detailed elaboration of the kinds of evidence
necessary in cases brought under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, including "historical, social and
political factors generally suggested as probative of [vote] dilution." Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.
Supp. 345, 354 (E.D.N.C. 1984). The district court relied upon two methods of statistical analyses
that are standard in proving racially polarized voting in § 2 cases: "extreme case" analysis and
"ecological regression" analysis, both performed by experts. Id. at 367 n.29. See also Major v.
Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 338-339 (E.D. La. 1983) (relying on expert testimony to invalidate a
reapportionment plan invalidated under § 2 of Voting Rights Act).
For literature on the kinds of expert analyses necessary in voting rights cases, see Richard L.
Engstrom and Michael D. McDonald, Quantitative Evidence in Vote Dilution Litigation: Political
Participation and Polarized Voting, 17 Urban Law. 369 (1985); Bernard Grofman, et al., The "To-
tality of Circumstances Test" in Section 2 of the 1982 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: A
Social Science Perspective, 7 L. & Pol. 199 (1985) (cited in Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53, n.20).
For a discussion of the role of expert historians, see Peyton McCrary and J. Gerald Hebert,
Keeping the Courts Honest: The Role of Historians as Expert Witnesses in Southern Voting
Rights Cases, 16 S. U. L. Rev. 101 (1989). McCrary and Hebert observed that in the 1980s histori-
ans serving as expert witnesses had a significant impact on the outcome of several federal voting
rights cases. Id. at 101 & n.1 (citing Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982);
Brown v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982),
aff'd 706 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir.), aff'd 464 U.S. 1005 (1983); County Council of Sumter County v.
United States, 555 F. Supp. 694 (D.D.C. 1983); Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347
(M.D. Ala. 1986), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded 831 F.2d 247 (11th Cir. 1987)).
86. See Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law and Litigation, § 32.3(6) at 32-13
(Clark Boardman Co., 1990) (citing Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 334-39 (7th
Cir. 1974), on remand 706 F.2d 204, 208-11 (7th Cir. 1983)); Old West End Ass'n v. Buckeye
Federal Say. & Loan, 675 F. Supp. 1100, 1105-06 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Huertas v. East River Housing
Corp., 674 F. Supp. 440, 452-453 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Malone, 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1148-52 (E.D.
Mo. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. City of Parma,
Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1059-65 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd in pertinent part, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir.
1981); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1031-33 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 547
F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977)).
87. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination Law, § 32.3(6) at 32-14, § 33.2(5) at 33-4 (cited in
note 86). See also the deposition testimony of Dr. Gloria Johnson Powell in Westside Fair Housing
Company v. Westchester Investment Co., 721 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (on file in the West
Coast Regional Office of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.). "'[T]esters' are
individuals who, without an intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment, pose as renters or
purchasers for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices." Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982). In Havens Realty, the Supreme Court held that testers
given false information about the availability of housing have standing to sue under § 804 of the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988). 455 U.S. at 373-74.
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nificant effect on the financial ability of plaintiffs to bring and sustain
civil rights cases and has subverted the manifest purpose of the Fees
Act. Small firms or solo practitioners cannot contemplate litigation in
which, even if successful, they must absorb five- or six-figure sums ex-
pended on expert witness testimony necessary for their success. The
most well-off public interest law firms may be able to advance tens of
thousands of dollars without hope of recovery in one or two cases, but
they cannot sustain such losses in several or many cases without com-
promising their financial integrity or curtailing the number or kind of
cases they file."' Judges, and certainly justices on the Supreme Court,
know this, given their role in devising and implementing the substan-
tive standards governing interpretation of civil rights statutes as well as
their familiarity with market conditions gained through deciding fees
litigation. Casey then is an example of either judicial callousness or in-
tellectual sophistry. It elevates a concern for legislative fastidiousness
over the effectuation of the plain purpose of the Fees Act. That purpose
is inherent in the very nature of a fee-shifting statute: it must be in-
tended to shield specified classes of plaintiffs from bearing the expenses
of vindicating certain rights so that it is possible for them to do so."'
Since Casey that purpose has been frustrated.90 In Jeffers v. Clin-
88. Telephone Interview with Steve Ralston of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc. (January 10, 1992).
89. We do not rest our analysis on the legislative history of the Fees Act, which Justice Scalia
refused to consider in Casey. One need not consult the legislative history of the Fees Act to ascer-
tain that its manifest purpose-the facilitation of plaintiffs' ability to vindicate their rights-is
subverted by Casey.
However, when the legislative history strongly supports the plain purpose (i.e., that purpose
without which the statute is rendered nonsensical), it makes no sense to ignore that history. Stated
differently, when the statute is rendered meaningless if a given purpose is not ascribed to it, and
the legislative history reflects that purpose, nothing should compel a court to ignore that history.
The issue of judicial restraint is not raised, as it might be where congressional purpose is murky
and the legislative history contains two strongly competing views regarding the matter subject to
interpretation.
The Senate Report accompanying the Fees Act reflects unrelated congressional intent that the
vindication of civil rights should not depend on the ability of a private citizen to afford a lawyer:
[C]ivil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have proved
an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the
important Congressional policies which these laws contain.
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce the
law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to
assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are not to
proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them
to vindicate these rights in court.
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, S. Rep. No. 94- 1011, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2 (1976).
90. The losses began to mount even prior to Casey. See Martin v. Mabus, 734 F. Supp. 1216,
1224-24 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (denying the plaintiffs $78,395.57 in expert witness fees and limiting
them to $30 per day, totaling $4,779.27). See also notes 43-44 and accompanying text (regarding
Major v. Treen).
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ton,9 1 for example, African-American plaintiffs successfully brought a
statewide suit against the Arkansas Board of Apportionment under Sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.92 The district court's opinion
identified the standard of proof the Supreme Court established in Sec-
tion 2 cases9" and explicitly relied on plaintiffs' experts' testimony in
determining that the requisite standard of proof was met.9 4 In a subse-
quent decision on the plaintiffs' application for fees and expenses, the
district court acknowledged that "[t]his mammoth case could not have
been undertaken without the Legal Defense Fund's lawyers and re-
sources," 95 thus reflecting the difficulty solo or small practitioners have
in financing such litigation. Yet, relying on Casey, the court denied
plaintiffs' request for $86,820 in expert witness fees and expenses" and
reimbursed plaintiffs, at the $40 per day rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C.
Section 1821, in the amount of $2,236. a  Consequently, to vindicate
their clients' civil and constitutional rights successfully, the plaintiffs'
attorneys had to expend $84,584 of their own money without recovery.
It is unlikely that antitrust, securities, or commercial litigation lawyers
would provide representation under similar circumstances.
Casey's effects defy precise measurement for two reasons. First, public interest organizations
with greater resources may not feel the effects of Casey as immediately as a small firm or solo
practitioners, who might instantly be driven out of civil rights practice or even into bankruptcy by
having to absorb tens of thousands of dollars. The public interest organization may be able to
litigate several cases before it changes its litigation docket. Second, it is difficult to quantify accu-
rately the number of cases not filed following the Casey decision because of the classic problem of
proving a negative-they do not show up. The best one can do is to gather anecdotal accounts of
unfiled cases that would have incurred substantial expert witness fees and expenses.
91. 730 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Ark. 1989), aff'd 111 S. Ct. 662 (1991). The district court's opinion
is dated December 4, 1989. A first dissenting opinion by Judge Eisele was dated three days later,
and a second concurring and dissenting opinion by Judge Eisele was dated January 26, 1990.
92. Id. at 217.
93. Id. at 205, citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). Plaintiffs are required
1) to establish that the minority group challenging the election scheme is sufficiently large and
geographically compact enough to constitute a majority in a single member district; 2) to show that
the minority grodp is politically cohesive; and 3) to show that the majority votes sufficiently as a
bloc to usually defeat the minority group's preferred candidate. Id.
94. Id. (finding "that black communities in the areas of the State challenged by plaintiffs are
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in single-member districts"
and relying heavily on the plaintiffs' expert's testimony); id. at 206-07 (reproducing the maps
drawn by the expert for alternative House and Senate districts); id. at 208-09 (crediting and rely-
ing upon the single regression, double regression, and homogeneous- precinct analyses of another
expert for the plaintiff).
95. 776 F. Supp. 465, 469 (E.D. Ark. 1991). The court further noted that two other public
interest organizations, Eastern Arkansas Legal Services and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights, "refused to handle the case because of its difficulty and broad scope." Id. at 473.
96. Id. at 474 Appendix A. $82,882 of the amount denied had been advanced by the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, while $3,938 was submitted directly to the court by one of the plaintiffs'
experts. Id. at 475, 476 Appendix A.
97. Id. at 474.
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Although Casey does not affect a civil rights plaintiff's ability to
win meaningful substantive relief in a case in which expert witness fees
are denied, the decision's impact is felt by the attorneys whose re-
sources have been depleted by the amount of expert witness fees they
have had to absorb. That amount is, in effect, subtracted from whatever
attorney's fees they can recover pursuant to the Fees Act or other statu-
tory authorization, thus making a civil rights case a more risky and less
attractive venture. Similarly, civil rights organizations must absorb the
amount expended on expert witnesses through their general budget. Of
course whatever amount is spent on expert witnesses is not available to
litigate the next case. 98
There is already troubling evidence that Casey has had precisely
this effect. In Garza v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors,"9 the
Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) won a major vic-
tory under the Voting Rights Act, paving the way for the election of the
first Latino supervisor to the Board. The complex case demanded sub-
stantial preparatory and testimonial assistance from experts.
MALDEF's application for fees detailed $152,942.45 in out-of-pocket
expenses for experts. But Casey, decided just a few days after the fees
application was filed, made recovery of these expenses impossible. Be-
cause MALDEF was forced to absorb the costs for experts in Garza, it
had fewer funds available for additional litigation and found it neces-
sary to declare a moratorium on the filing of new litigation for the re-
maining quarter of its 1991-92 fiscal year. According to E. Richard
Larson, Deputy Director of MALDEF, "[h]ad we been able to recover
our $152,942.45 in expert fees in Garza, we probably would not have
imposed the moratorium on new litigation.100
One can ascribe one of two motives to the Court's reasoning in
Casey. The Court may be engaging in a roving exercise to ensure statu-
tory aestheticism in which it turns up its nose at the sausage-making
nature of the political process and insists on filet, or it may be acting
out, under cloak of "judicial restraint," its hostility to civil rights plain-
98. Of its annual $1.2 million litigation budget, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund spends an
average of $200,000 per year on expert witness services. Its deputy director counsel has stated that
"everything we do is expert witness driven" and that "in recent years LDF has lost many cooperat-
ing attorneys because they were unable to carry the expenses in civil rights cases, of which expert
witness fees are a significant proportion." Telephone Interview with Clyde Murphy, Deputy Direc-
tor Counsel for the NAACP LDF (Jan. 10, 1992).
99. 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal.), aff'd 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990).
100. Letter from E. Richard Larson to Theodore M. Shaw (January 14, 1992) (on file with
the Authors). Larson further noted: "We currently have many cases in the pipeline-mostly redis-
tricting cases-in which we have had to expend substantial sums in expert fees. Our inability to




tiffs and their lawyers. The former fails to consider and respect the in-
herent nature of the operative processes by which a coordinate branch
of the federal government reaches its decisions; the latter should be be-
neath the dignity of the Supreme Court. Neither is acceptable.
In the end, it is a question of responsibility. "Plain meaning" al-
lows interpreters to deny responsibility, to deny their inevitable law-
making roles, to deny-as Llewellyn put it-their "continuing duty...
to make sense, under and within the law."' 01
Forty years ago Llewellyn contrasted "Grand" and "Formal" styles
of statutory interpretation. 02 In the Grand Style "statutes were con-
strued 'freely' to implement their purpose, the court commonly ac-
cepting the legislature's choice of policy and setting to work to
implement it."' 0 ' In the Formal Style, however, "statutes tended to be
limited or even eviscerated by wooden and literal reading, in a sort of
long-drawn battle between a balky, stiff-necked, wrong-headed court
and a legislature which had only words with which to drive that
court."'01 4 In 1950 Llewellyn could report that "the courts have
regained, in the main, a cheerful acceptance of legislative choice of pol-
icy," although adjudicators still were "hampered to some extent" by
Formalist doctrine carried forth from earlier days."' Oh, what would he
think about Casey!
V. EPILOGUE
Section 1988 received further Supreme Court scrutiny in 1991. In
Kay v. Ehrler,0 6 the Court ruled that Section 1988 did not authorize
the award of fees to an attorney who had represented himself in a civil
rights action that successfully challenged a Kentucky election law. Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that permitting
an award of attorney's fees to a pro se litigant would "create a disincen-
tive to employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff considered himself
competent to litigate on his own behalf.' 107 The statute's purpose of
facilitating the litigation of meritorious claims, Stevens observed, would
be "better served by a rule that creates an incentive to retain counsel in
every such case." 108
101. Llewellyn, 3 Vand. L. Rev. at 399 (cited in note 1).




106. 111 S. Ct. 1435 (1991).




Whether or not one agrees with Stevens' reasoning,1°9 we salute his
inquiry into the policy of the statute. We find remarkable, however,
Justice Scalia's silence in the case. Under a "plain meaning" approach,
attorney Kay would seem to have a good case under Section 1988. The
statute- which Stevens does not quote-provides that a court "may
allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs."'110 Mr. Kay not only acted as an attorney; he is in fact a member
of the bar. Indeed, as Justice Stevens acknowledged, "Kay competently
fulfilled his professional duties in the case.""' Why, under a literal
reading of the statutory text, should he not be compensated for the
time he spent successfully lawyering?" 2
What unites Scalia's views in Kay and Casey, then, cannot be sim-
ple fidelity to "plain meaning." Rather, it appears to be a disinclination
to award attorney's fees to successful civil rights plaintiffs. Justice
Scalia thus has failed to learn the lesson he seeks to teach others-that
a primary defense of a "plain meaning" approach is its ability to limit
the discretion of judges by keeping them to the solemn words of the
text. We can conclude only that for Justice Scalia some texts and some
statutory purposes are more sacred than others.
109. We have our doubts. Why isn't the requirement of success in the litigation enough of a
screen to ensure the bringing only of meritorious cases?
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
111. Kay, 111 S. Ct. at 1437.
112. Arguably, the statute requires an actual fee owed by the litigant to an attorney, just as
it awards "costs" to the prevailing party. But surely attorney Kay could bill himself for his ser-
vices; indeed, he incurred clear opportunity costs by taking his own case.
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